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Abstract in English 
The Dutch innovation voucher aims to stimulate the interaction between small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) and public research institutes. This document provides an estimate of 
the effectiveness of the innovation voucher instrument, employing the fact that the vouchers 
were assigned randomly by means of a lottery. The main conclusion is that the innovation 
voucher instrument does stimulate SMEs to engage in many new assignments with public 
research institutes. Out of every ten vouchers, eight are used for a project that would not have 
been assigned without such a voucher, one is used for a project that would have been assigned 
anyhow, and one voucher is not used. An overall assessment of the innovation voucher 
also needs to take into account the value added of the additional assignments, however. No 
insights have yet been obtained here. 
 
Key words: policy evaluation, innovation, social experiment 
JEL code: O38, C93 
 
Abstract in Dutch 
De innovatievoucher is een in 2004 geïntroduceerd beleidsinstrument om ondernemers in het 
Midden- en Kleinbedrijf (MKB-ers) meer in contact te brengen met kennisinstellingen zoals 
universiteiten, hogescholen en TNO. Dit document meet de effectiviteit (output) van dit 
beleidsinstrument en maakt daarbij gebruik van het feit dat de vouchers door middel van loting 
zijn toegekend. De centrale conclusie is dat de innovatievoucher MKB-ers aanzet tot veel extra 
opdrachten aan kennisinstellingen. Van elke tien beschikbaar gestelde innovatievouchers 
worden er acht gebruikt voor opdrachten die zonder voucher niet verleend zouden zijn, wordt er 
één gebruikt voor een opdracht die zonder voucher ook verleend zou zijn, en wordt één voucher 
niet gebruikt. Voor een totaalbeeld van het voucherprogramma dient echter ook de toegevoegde 
waarde van contacten met een kennisinstelling voor de MKB-er en voor de maatschappij als 
geheel (outcome van het beleidsinstrument) in ogenschouw te worden genomen. Hiervoor is op 
dit moment nog onvoldoende informatie beschikbaar. 
 
Steekwoorden: beleidsevaluatie, innovatie, gecontroleerd experiment. 
 
Een Nederlandstalige versie van dit rapport is verschenen als ‘De effectiviteit van de 
innovatievoucher 2004’, CPB Document 95, 2005. Dit rapport is, evenals een uitgebreide 
Nederlandse samenvatting, beschikbaar via www.cpb.nl. 
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Summary 
The 2004 Dutch innovation voucher aims to increase the interaction between small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and public knowledge institutes, e.g. universities and 
technology transfer institutes. The value of the voucher is 7.500 euro. 
 
To what extent is the innovation voucher an effective policy instrument? We measure 
‘interaction’ as the number of assignments SMEs commission to public knowledge institutes. 
Effectiveness is the difference in the number of assignments commissioned by SMEs with and 
without voucher. Since the innovation vouchers have been allocated at random - 1044 SMEs 
applied for 100 vouchers -, this difference is likely to be a causal effect of the voucher rather 
than a correlation that is explained in other ways. Arguments other than the voucher can not 
explain any differences, because they hold for both SMEs with and without voucher. Indeed, 
SMEs with and without voucher turn out not to differ considerably on various observable firm 
characteristics.  
 
The main conclusion of the study is that the innovation voucher stimulates SMEs to engage in 
many additional assignments with public knowledge institutes. Out of every ten vouchers, eight 
are used for a project that would not have been assigned without such a voucher, one is used for 
a project that would have been assigned anyhow, and one voucher is not used. There is some 
evidence that a few of the additional assignments are actually assignments that would have been 
commissioned somewhere in the future, but that have been ordered earlier because of the 
voucher. 
 
An overall assessment of the innovation voucher policy instrument also needs evidence about 
the value-added of more science-industry interaction. Follow-up assignments (paid for in full 
privately) and increased innovation capacities are two sorts of signals for value-added. These 
signals could be observed within a year or two. Another way to secure some value-added is to 
require SMEs to match the voucher with private funds. In such a case SMEs will only apply for 
an innovation voucher if they expect some value-added. 
 
The set-up of the innovation voucher policy program, in particular the lottery that allocates the 
vouchers at random, offers a good starting point to assess the causal impact of the policy 
instrument. Knowledge of the causal effects of knowledge policy is relatively scarce. Similar 
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1  Introduction 
Does innovation policy indeed promote innovation? At the moment not much is known about 
the effectiveness of current Dutch innovation policy (IBO Technologiebeleid, 2002). This is an 
obstacle to political debate and the discussion concerning appropriate policy instruments. After 
all, the ambition to enhance the innovative strength of an economy is not very productive if it is 
not clear which instruments bring that goal closer and which do not. 
 
The main reason why so little is known about the effectiveness of innovation policy is that it is 
difficult to determine whether innovation policy leads to additional innovation activities or 
whether firms that are already innovating more will also make more use of innovation policy. 
Or to put it another way, we do not know to what extent a positive correlation between 
innovation policy and innovation is actually causal or merely apparent (Cornet and Webbink, 
2004; David et al., 2004). In the first case, innovation policy is effective; in the second, it is not, 
because private investments are substituted by public investments. 
 
It is possible to assess the effectiveness of the innovation voucher – an instrument of Dutch 
innovation policy introduced in 2004 – because the vouchers are allocated randomly by means 
of a lottery among applicant firms. Because of the random allocation, any difference in 
innovative behaviour between firms with a voucher and firms without a voucher is purely the 
causal effect of the voucher and not a correlation that can be explained by other factors. After 
all, because of the random allocation of the vouchers these other factors will apply as much to 
firms with a voucher as to firms without a voucher. Hence these factors cannot explain the 
difference in innovative behaviour. 
 
The main objective of the innovation voucher is to introduce small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) to public and semi-public research institutions such as universities, 
polytechnics and the Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research TNO. The 
voucher is a credit note worth EUR 7,500, to be spent at such a research institution. It is 
intended to address a perceived deficit in interaction between commercial firms and research 
institutions. 
 
This report seeks to contribute to the evidence of the effectiveness of innovation policy by 
examining the effects of the 100 innovation vouchers allocated randomly among 1,044 
applicant SMEs in September 2004. These 100 vouchers constituted the first round of an 
innovation voucher pilot with which the Ministry of Economic Affairs wants to gain experience 
with this innovation policy instrument. Some 400 vouchers were distributed in a second 
allocation round in March 2005, and a third round is planned for the autumn of 2005. 
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The central research question in this study is whether SMEs with a voucher commission more 
assignments from research institutions than SMEs without a voucher. The main objective of the 
policy instrument is thus concretised as promoting the commissioning of research assignments 
by SMEs from research institutions. The study also looks at the effect of the voucher on the 
value of assignments, and the effect of the voucher on the timing of assignments. 
 
An overall assessment of the voucher instrument requires evidence not only of its effectiveness 
(also called the “output”), but also of the added value of additional contacts for the SMEs 
involved and for society as a whole (also called the “outcome”). This issue of added value is not 
central to this study, but when any indications of the creation of added value or otherwise can 
be demonstrated, they will be reported. 
 
The structure of the document is as follows. Chapter 2 formulates the research question. 
Chapter 3 discusses the reasons for and the objective and design of the innovation voucher. 
Chapter 4 presents the research data, which are analysed in chapter 5. Chapter 6 offers a number 
of conclusions.  
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2  Research question 
2.1  The central research question 
The aim of this study is to measure the effectiveness of the voucher instrument against its main 
objective of “introducing small and medium-sized enterprises to public research institutions” 
(Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2004a). In this study this “introducing” is concretised as the 
commissioning of research assignments from public research institutions. Hence the central 
research question is as follows: 
 
What is the effect of the innovation voucher on the commissioning of assignments by small and 
medium-sized enterprises from public research institutions? 
 
Specifically, three partial effects are distinguished: 
·  The effect on the number of knowledge transfer projects: does the innovation voucher 
instrument lead to more assignments by SMEs for public research institutions over a certain 
period? 
·  The effect on the size of knowledge transfer projects: does the innovation voucher instrument 
lead to larger assignments by SMEs for public research institutions? 
·  The effect on the timing of knowledge transfer projects: does the innovation voucher instrument 
lead to already planned assignments for public research institutions being brought forward? 
 
The effect on the timing of assignments may counter the voucher’s two positive additionality 
aspects, namely the effects on the number and value of assignments. It is possible that the 
innovation vouchers lead to more assignments in the voucher period, but that some of these 
assignments were already planned and that the allocation of an innovation voucher merely 
brings them forward in time. The effect on the number of assignments in the voucher period 
will then overestimate the actual additionality provided by the voucher instrument.  
2.2  What lies beyond the scope of this study 
Each research question sets demarcations. It is not possible to answer all relevant or interesting 
questions. And those answers that can be given invariably need to be qualified in some way. 
This study is no exception. This section discusses six limits to the central research question. 
 
Firstly, this study does not comment on the long-term effect of the innovation vouchers on the 
number and value of assignments commissioned by SMEs from public research institutions. 
The introduction of the innovation voucher instrument has been too recent for that. A follow-up  
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analysis (for instance in one or two years’ time) among both firms with a voucher and firms 
without a voucher will have to show whether the identified effects have been sustained. That is 
to say, whether the allocation of an innovation voucher has had a lasting effect in the interaction 
between SMEs and public research institutions. We would like to stress that an understanding 
of these longer-term effects is necessary to decide whether the voucher instrument as a whole 
has been a success. 
 
Secondly, this study does not comment on the specific effects of the innovation voucher 
instrument on the behaviour of SMEs on the one hand and public research institutions on the 
other. The identified effects are the result of any behavioural changes in SMEs and/or public 
research institutions. In that sense what happens among SMEs and research institutions as a 
result of the innovation voucher instrument can be characterised as a “black box”.
1 Knowledge 
of the contents of this black box is not necessary for the purposes of this study, however, since 
its primary goal is to examine rather than to understand the effectiveness of the innovation 
voucher instrument. 
 
Thirdly, this study does not comment on a possible separate effect of the voucher instrument on 
the behaviour of firms which do not receive a voucher, what has been called the “John Henry 
effect” (see e.g. Krueger, 1999). The idea is that the innovation voucher instrument makes 
“voucher losers” aware of the opportunities and advantages of placing research problems with 
public research institutions.
2 For that reason participation in the voucher allocation round may 
in itself induce an SME to commission a research assignment. If this is the case, then the effect 
of the innovation voucher found in this study will underestimate the actual effect.
3 
 
Fourthly, in our view it is inappropriate to generalise a finding on the effectiveness of an 
instrument on the basis of a limited pilot to a large-scale introduction of that instrument, and 
this study does not do so. It may not be accidental that some SMEs apply for the limited pilot at 
the first opportunity, while others do so at a later stage.
4 The first group of SMEs may already 
have specific research questions, for instance, and the second may not. The effect of the 
voucher instrument may therefore differ for the two groups. The upshot is that the effect of the 
instrument’s large-scale introduction may differ from that of the pilot. It is also worth noting 
that any differences may be small when the differences in scale are small. 
 
1 An example of a possible effect of the innovation voucher instrument on the behaviour of SMEs is that these firms may 
develop a more positive attitude towards public research institutions, while the behaviour of public research institutions may 
be influenced by operating in a more market-oriented way. This study does not address the issue of which problems the 
innovation vouchers may help to solve among both research providers and research users. 
2 The formulation of a research problem is not obligatory at the voucher application stage, but the application form does ask 
which research question the SME would like to have answered. 
3 Incidentally, a John Henry effect is difficult to identify in an experimental setting, because it cannot be distinguished from a 
time-specific effect. 
4 The technical term for this is “selectivity”.  
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Fifthly, this study does not comment on the eventual outcome of the contacts between SMEs 
and public research institutions. The knowledge transfer may lead to an improvement in or even 
the development of new operational processes and/or products. These outcomes of the voucher 
instrument can only be observed over the longer term, however. 
 
And sixthly, this study does not seek to answer the question how the effectiveness of the 
innovation voucher instrument relates to that of other instruments deployed in the Netherlands 
to improve the interaction between commercial firms and research institutions.
5 
2.3  Summary 
The central research question is: “what is the effect of the innovation voucher on the 
commissioning of assignments by small and medium-sized enterprises from public research 
institutions?” The overall effect is distinguished in terms of the number, the size and the timing 
of the assignments. At this stage it is not or not yet possible to assess the long-term effects of 
the innovation voucher, the possible effect on SMEs which have applied for a voucher but are 
not allocated one, or the effect on the behaviour of SMEs on the one hand and research 
institutions on the other. 
 
5 Canton et al. (2005) present an overview of several policy instruments aimed at promoting the interaction between 
commercial firms and research institutions, but they conclude that very little is known about the effectiveness of these other 
policy instruments: “Unfortunately, our understanding on the effectiveness of the various programs and policy initiatives is 
very limited”.  
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3  The innovation voucher pilot in 2004 
The promotion of knowledge diffusion between public and other research institutions and 
commercial firms constitutes a major objective of current Dutch innovation policy. But the 
interaction between science and industry leaves something to be desired from a social 
perspective. The literature offers several theoretical explanations for this suboptimal interaction. 
Impeding factors are evident both from the side of commercial firms (the demand side) and 
from the side of research institutions (the supply side) (see box below). This chapter discusses 
the reasons for the introduction of the innovation voucher (section 3.1), the objective of the 
voucher (section 3.2), and the precise design of the instrument (section 3.3). 
Problems with the interaction between commercial firms and research institutions 
Canton et al. (2005) give an overview of potential barriers to the successful interaction between industry and science. 
On the side of industry, the main problem tends to be firms’ limited capacity to absorb the knowledge available in 
research institutions. But the capacity to absorb knowledge from outside the firm and eventually to commercialise it can 
be created through the firm’s own research and development efforts and links with the scientific world (see Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1989). A second barrier relates to the capital market, for instance in the form of a shortage of venture capital. 
These problems prevent firms from investing in research and development. A third barrier for industry may be that 
information problems between the owners and managers of firms may give managers insufficient incentives to innovate 
or adopt new technologies (see Aghion and Howitt, 1998). 
 
Problems on the side of public research institutions, such as universities, flow from the fact that these institutions have 
different objectives from commercial firms. Three specific barriers can be identified on the side of research institutions in 
this context. The first problem is the formulation of scientists’ research agendas. Research institutions usually do not 
have much incentive to gear their research agendas to demands from industry; they are more focused on conducting 
basic  and  other  research  that  fits  in  with  their  own  interests  (“curiosity-driven”)  or  that  enhances  the  chances  of 
publication in scientific journals (see Cornet and Van de Ven, 2004).
a
 A second problem is the inclination among 
scientists towards openness. Scientists are often rewarded by the quantity and quality of their publications, while firms 
often benefit more from keeping research results secret or shielding them from their competitors (see Dasgupta and 
David, 1994, who refer to the “norm of disclosure” versus the “norm of secrecy”). A third problem is the lack of an 




Number of considerations may legitimate a difference in research specialisations between public research institutions and commercial 
firms, such as knowledge development for public tasks and differences among technology spheres in terms of the extent of knowledge 
spillovers (see Rensman, 2004). 
Source: Canton et al. (2005). 
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3.1  Reasons for the innovation voucher 
There is a widely held view that knowledge diffusion to small and medium-sized enterprises in 
particular is inadequate. The government’s policy paper In actie voor Innovatie (“In Action for 
Innovation”) (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2003) puts it as follows: “SMEs do not make 
sufficient use of knowledge that others have to offer, even though the available knowledge 
could play a major role in developing new products, processes or services”; and “The 
knowledge exchange between SMEs and research institutions in the Netherlands is not 
optimal”. Different reasons have been adduced for this (see Innovatieplatform, 2004; 
Adviesraad voor Wetenschaps- en Technologiebeleid, 2005). They can be summarised as 
follows: 
·  Differences in time horizons (with relatively long-term projects at research institutions 
compared to the relatively quick results required by commercial firms) and in cultures between 
SMEs and research institutions; 
·  Poor access to the public knowledge infrastructure: research institutions are not always 
receptive to research questions from SMEs and/or are not equipped to deal with such questions; 
·  Information problems: SMEs do not always know where they can get an answer to a particular 
research question; 
·  SMEs are not always able to formulate research problems in a way that appeals to research 
institutions. 
 
In order to promote the knowledge transfer between SMEs and public research institutions, the 
Innovation Platform in 2004 proposed the introduction of “innovation vouchers”. This 
innovation voucher is intended as a credit note which SMEs can use to buy technological and 
other knowledge from or place an application-oriented research problem with a public or semi-
public knowledge provider. The innovation voucher scheme was launched by the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs in September 2004 in the form of a pilot with 100 innovation vouchers. 
 
The idea of an innovation voucher is not new in the Netherlands. In the recent past a number of 
regional schemes with knowledge vouchers were introduced in the southern provinces.
6 But 
these were small-scale initiatives of a temporary nature. 
 
6 Examples of such projects include: “research vouchers” in the province of Limburg (1997-1999), “Southern Netherlands 
knowledge vouchers” (2001-2004), “inter-regional vouchers” (2001-2002), “cross-border knowledge vouchers” (2002-2004) 
and “Interreg mid-Benelux area innovation vouchers” (2005-2007) (source: www.interregio.nu).  
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3.2  Objective of the innovation voucher 
The primary objective of the introduction of the innovation voucher is to introduce SMEs to 
knowledge providers (see Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2004a). Secondary objectives are to 
encourage public knowledge providers to respond more to private knowledge demand, to 
stimulate direct links between SMEs and research institutions, and to mobilise latent research 
questions among SMEs. 
The objectives of the Innovation Platform in this context are similar to those of the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs (see Innovatieplatform, 2004): 
·  To introduce SMEs to knowledge providers (lowering the threshold); 
·  To make research institutions operate in a more demand-oriented way (managing demand); 
·  To enable SMEs to purchase research capacity from research institutions in order to answer 
application-oriented research questions; 
·  To ensure that SMEs use more of the available knowledge among knowledge providers 
(bridging the knowledge gap). 
 
3.3  Design of the innovation voucher 
3.3.1  Outline of the scheme 
The innovation voucher is a credit note with which an SME can commission a research question 
from a public research institution. The voucher has a maximum value of EUR 7,500 and cannot 
be cashed in. The research questions should be application-oriented, in the sense that the SME 
should be able to use the knowledge to improve its products or operational processes. Examples 
mentioned in the subsidy scheme document are solving a minor technological problem or 
setting out the possible solutions for a complex technological problem. (See appendix A for the 
full text in Dutch of the subsidy scheme document, “Subsidieregeling pilot innovatievouchers 
2004”, as published in the Staatscourant, the government gazette.) 
 
The procedure for the innovation voucher scheme is as follows. An SME submits an application 
for an innovation voucher with SenterNovem, an agency of the Ministry of Economic Affairs. 
(See appendix B for the innovation voucher application form, in Dutch.) In principle the 
innovation vouchers are allocated on a “first come, first serve” basis, subject to the condition 
that if the number of applications received on a single day exceeds the number of available 
vouchers, then the vouchers are allocated randomly to that day’s applicants by means of a 
lottery (conducted by a civil-law notary). (See appendix B for the guidelines on the allocation of 
the vouchers, “Beleidsregel verstrekking innovatievouchers 2004”, in Dutch.) When an SME 
has been allocated an innovation voucher, it formulates a research question and commissions a 
public research institution to find an answer to the question. At the same time the SME hands  
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the innovation voucher over to the research institution, which on completion of the assignment 
claims the voucher up to a maximum of EUR 7,500 per assignment. If answering the research 
question costs more than EUR 7,500, then the SME has to pay the research institution the 
difference from its own funds. 
3.3.2  Specific features of the scheme 
The innovation voucher instrument contains several specific features which may be relevant to 
this analysis. 
Characteristics of the voucher applicants 
Only SMEs can apply for innovation vouchers, and each firm can only apply for one voucher. 
But it is possible to bundle vouchers, in the sense that several firms which have been allocated 
vouchers can jointly put a question to a research institution. Up to 10 vouchers can be bundled. 
The vouchers are not transferable. An SME applying for an innovation voucher may not have 
received more than EUR 100,000 in government subsidies over a three-year period. 
Characteristics of the research institutions 
Innovation vouchers can only be placed with a defined group of public and semi-public research 
institutions, which are listed in the subsidy scheme document. The eligible research institutions 
include universities and polytechnics as well as Leading Technological Institutes (TTIs) and 
intermediary research institutions such as the Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific 
Research TNO. 
Characteristics of the voucher project 
The research question formulated by the SME must be application-oriented, so that the firm can 
use the knowledge to improve its products or operational processes. This implies that the 
innovation vouchers cannot be used for ongoing projects at the research institution in question, 
since in such cases it has already undertaken commitments concerning the research question. 
Phasing of the scheme 
At the outset a series of deadlines was attached to participation in the scheme and use of the 
voucher.
7 The scheme took effect two days after the official announcement in the Staatscourant 
of 15 September 2004. Successful SME applicants had to formulate a research question, select a 
research institution and commission the assignment by 31 December 2004. The research 
institutions had to complete the assignment by 29 April 2005. 
 
 
7 The idea being that innovation vouchers should not be left lying around for too long and that the research institutions 
should work relatively quickly (see Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2004a).  
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Table 3.1 shows the phasing of the scheme in detail. The first phase covers the period before the 
scheme was even established, while the fifth and final phase covers the period after the first 
pilot round.
8 The table also shows when SMEs with a voucher (“voucher winners”) and SMEs 
without a voucher (“voucher losers”) were surveyed. 
Table 3.1  Phasing of the innovation voucher scheme 
Period
  Date  Events 
     
1: Before 2004    No innovation voucher instrument 
     






Final proposal by Innovation Platform for innovation vouchers for SMEs
 
Official publication of scheme in the Staatscourant (first pilot round, 100 
vouchers) 
Opening date for innovation voucher applications; 1,044 applications, 
budget exhausted on first day 
Announcement of 100 voucher winners in first pilot (after lottery) 
     





Formulation of research question, selection of research institution, 
preparation of assignment 
Telephone survey among voucher winners in first pilot round 
Announcement of second pilot round in 2005 
Deadline for voucher winners to commission assignments from research 
institutions
a 
     








Execution of assignment, voucher value to be claimed by research 
institution at SenterNovem 
Official publication of second pilot round in 2005 in the Staatscourant (400 
vouchers) 
Opening date for innovation voucher applications in 2005 (second round); 
1,700 applications, budget again exhausted on first day
b 
Announcement of 400 vouchers winners in second pilot (after lottery) 
Deadline for research institutions to claim the subsidies for the 2004 pilot
a 
     
5: After 1 May 05  May-June 
31 October 
Telephone survey among voucher winners and losers in first pilot round 
Deadline for research institutions to claim the subsidies for the 2005 pilot 
    a
 During the first pilot round in 2004 SenterNovem allowed some flexibility on the deadlines, specifically with regard to assignment 
placement by SMEs and subsidy applications by research institutions. 
b
 Winners from the first round in 2004 were not allowed to participate in the second round. Losers from the first round in 2004 were 
allowed to apply for another voucher, but they had no greater chance of winning than new applicants. 
Sources: Ministry of Economic Affairs (2004a), SenterNovem (www.senternovem.nl) 
 
Other features 
When designing the innovation voucher instrument, the Ministry of Economic Affairs decided 
to apply relatively few restrictions with regard to either the applicants or the activities for which 
the vouchers could be used. In principle SMEs from all industries can apply for a voucher, 
although for external legal reasons several industries have been excluded from participation.
9 
Furthermore, there are no obligations to spend the voucher in certain technological areas, and 
 
8 These period divisions were also used for the survey conducted among both voucher winners and voucher losers. 
9 See appendix B, “Beleidsregels innovatievouchers 2004”, notes to section 1.  
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there are no restrictions on the type or level of the research question placed with the public 
research institution. The reasoning behind this approach is that it offers a good insight during 
the pilot phase into the kind of research issues that concern SMEs. Another benefit is that it 
reduces the management costs for the executive agency (in this case, SenterNovem), because 
there is no need to assess the substance of the applications. However, a possible disadvantage of 
the absence of such an assessment is that the social value of the projects is not taken into 
account as an allocation criterion. 
 
The innovation voucher scheme does not make any demands on SMEs to put up funds of their 
own. No matching is required, in other words. As long as answering the research question does 
not cost more than EUR 7,500, the project will be subsidised in full. It is of course possible to 
commission a research question that will cost more than the maximum voucher value of EUR 
7,500 to answer. In that case the costs above this amount will have to be borne by the SME in 
question. 
 
When making the application the SME is not required to provide any details of the research 
question it wishes to raise, nor about the research institution where it wants to place the research 
question. There is no obligation to submit a project plan. This keeps down the administrative 
burden of the innovation voucher instrument for SMEs.
10 
 
The Netherlands’s three technological universities – the Delft University of Technology, 
Eindhoven University of Technology and University of Twente – announced that they would 
double the voucher amount. This meant that SMEs which placed their innovation vouchers with 
these institutions would receive a discount of EUR 15,000 on the costs of answering the 
research question. 
Second round of the innovation voucher pilot 
The second round of the innovation voucher pilot in 2005 had several different features 
(Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2005b). The box below highlights the differences with the first 
round. The box also mentions some proposals for further changes to the instrument. However, it 
should be borne in mind that this study relates solely to the first voucher round in 2004. 
 
 
10 In addition to reading and completing a short application form, the SME is required at the end of the project to make a 
declaration to the effect that the knowledge transfer project has been completed to its satisfaction. The administrative 
burden of the innovation voucher for SMEs has been estimated at 30 minutes’ work (see Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
2004b).  
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The second round of the innovation voucher pilot in 2005 and beyond 
A second round of the innovation voucher pilot was launched in March 2005. This round was broadly similar to the first. 
The scheme’s formal primary objective, namely to introduce SMEs to research institutions, remains the same. The 
second pilot round also relied on a random allocation by means of a lottery if the number of applications received on a 
single day exceeded the number of available vouchers. This means that the second round is also suitable for an 
evaluation as undertaken in this study, namely on the basis of a comparison between voucher winners and voucher 
losers. However, the second pilot round differed from the first in several respects: 
 
•  Number of available vouchers: 400 innovation vouchers were available in the second round, compared to 100 in the 
  first; the total subsidy outlay for the second round was therefore EUR 3 million, compared to EUR 750,000 for the 
  first; 
•  List of permitted research institutions: in the second round SMEs were also allowed to place their innovation vouchers 
  with several private research institutions; those eligible were private companies with large research and development 
  departments  (i.e.  with  budgets  in  excess  of  EUR  60  million  in  2003)  whose  main  concern  was  not  to  exploit 
  knowledge commercially; 
•  Definition of research question: in the second round a voucher could not be used for the supply of goods (such as 
  software) or to provide a training course; 
•  Bundling of assignments: in the second round 100 of the 400 innovation vouchers were set aside for SMEs which 
  wanted to bundle their vouchers in order to have a particular research question answered; up to 10 vouchers could 
  be bundled for a single knowledge transfer project. 
 
In the meantime several proposals have also been put forward for further changes to the innovation voucher scheme 
(compared to the second pilot round). In a review of its policy instruments the Ministry of Economic Affairs observed that 
it is reasonable to expect SMEs to contribute to the costs of a knowledge transfer project, since they enjoy most of the 
benefits (see Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2005a). Furthermore, both the Science and Technology Policy Advisory 
Council (AWT) and the Innovation Platform (IP) have called for a broadening of the instrument. In their view innovation 
should be used not only to buy knowledge, but also to obtain specialist technical and commercial advice, for instance 
from private engineering and management consultancies (see AWT, 2005). And finally, the AWT has also suggested 
that access to the innovation vouchers should be restricted to those SMEs which do not obtain subsidies under the 
Research and Development Labor Tax Credit (WBSO).
a
 The AWT argues that this will ensure that more vouchers will 
end up with the “appliers” among the SMEs, which generally do not carry out their own research and development work, 
and fewer with those pioneering SMEs which do engage in R&D (see AWT, 2005). The Ministry of Economic Affairs has 
announced its intention to raise to 600 the number of available vouchers in the third round in the autumn of 2005 (see 




 Under the WBSO, firms can obtain reductions in the payroll tax and national insurance contributions due on research and development 
work. The higher the outlays on R&D, the higher the discount. 
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3.4  Summary 
The innovation voucher is a recently introduced policy instrument whose primary objective is to 
introduce small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to public and semi-public research 
institutions such as universities, polytechnics and the Netherlands Organisation for Applied 
Scientific Research TNO. The motivation is the perception that the knowledge diffusion from 
research institutions to SMEs is not effective in the Netherlands, even though it is precisely this 
knowledge which plays a major role in developing new products or services or improving 
operational processes. 
 
The innovation voucher is a credit note worth EUR 7,500, to be spent with a defined list of 
public and semi-public research institutions. Relatively few restrictions apply to the scheme. 
Any SME can submit an application for a voucher and there is no need to submit a project 
proposal. The costs of the research assignment are subsidised by the government up to  
EUR 7,500; any costs above this amount will have to be borne by the SME in question. 
 
In the first pilot round in September 2004, 100 innovation vouchers were available. Because of 
the considerable interest in the scheme, these were allocated randomly by means of a lottery. To 
use the allocated voucher, the SMEs had to commission a research assignment by 31 December 
2004 and the research institution had to complete this assignment by 29 April 2005. 
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4  Data 
In order to determine the effectiveness of the innovation voucher, we gathered information on 
the research assignments of those firms which participated in the voucher round in 2004. Some 
of this information was obtained from the application form, and some from a specially prepared 
survey, which was conducted by telephone among a sample of both firms which were allocated 
a voucher (“voucher winners”) and firms which were not allocated a voucher (“voucher 
losers”). 
 
With this information-gathering arrangement, it is possible to distinguish two groups of firms, 
namely the total group of applicants and the subgroup of survey participants. The application 
form provides information on a firm’s turnover, size (in terms of staff numbers), industry and 
region. By contrast, information on research assignments is only known for those firms which 
participated in the survey. Information obtained from the latter group of firms was used to 
examine the effectiveness of the innovation voucher. 
4.1  Survey structure and interviews 
In cooperation with SenterNovem we prepared a questionnaire whose aim was to obtain 
information on research assignments which SMEs placed with research institutions. The firms 
were asked to provide information on the timing of the assignment, the value of the assignment 
and which institution answered the research question; they were also asked to answer several 
questions aimed at gauging their satisfaction with various aspects of the assignment. In addition 
to these assignment-specific questions, the firms were asked to respond to several statements 
about the innovation voucher and they were asked what they would have done if, as applicable, 
they had or had not been allocated the voucher. (See appendix C for the questionnaire.) 
 
The SMEs were approached by SenterNovem for participation in a telephone interview, having 
been previously informed of the survey by letter. The interviews were qualitative and semi-
structured. That is to say, the interview was conceived as a “good discussion”, with the 
interviewer distilling the required information during and after the exchanges. The sequence of 
questions was clearly laid down, but the interviewer did not have to stick to it. This type of 
interview offers an opportunity to discuss more complex subjects and to make more intensive 
use of what are called “open” questions.  
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4.2  Data collection and response 
No fewer than 1,044 firms submitted application forms on the first day of applications for the 
innovation voucher round in 2004. Under the scheme rules, this meant that those firms which 
submitted their forms on the second day or later could not compete for the 100 available 
vouchers. The vouchers were allocated by means of a lottery among the 1,044 first-day 
applicants. 
 
Some 600 firms from this group of 1,044 firms were asked to participate in the telephone 
interview. The 600 selected firms comprised the 100 voucher winners and a random sample of 
500 of the 944 voucher losers. In week 16 of 2005 the 600 firms were asked by letter whether 
they were willing to participate in the interview, and the interviews were conducted during 
weeks 18-21 of 2005. 
 
Some 249 of the group of 600 selected firms could not be contacted during the interview 
period.
11 A further 37 firms indicated that they did not want to cooperate on a survey. A first 
check of the data led to the loss of one respondent, so that 313 usable observations remained for 
further analysis. This is equivalent to an overall response ratio of 52%. Of the 313 firms which 
participated in the survey, 71 had been allocated a voucher and 242 had not. This yields a net 
response ratio of 71% among voucher winners and 48% among voucher losers. 
4.3  Data description 
4.3.1  Characteristics of firms 
Research by the Ministry of Economic Affairs shows that the group of 1,044 innovation 
voucher applicants reflects a cross-section of SMEs in the Netherlands (see Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, 2005c). Where comparisons are made with the group of 1,044 applicants 
below, the relevant information has been obtained from this research by the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs. 
 
The average turnover of the firms which participated in the interview is EUR 2.7 million. The 
group of survey participants has a large proportion of smaller firms (with turnovers below EUR 
50,000) compared to the total group of 1,044 voucher applicants. The latter has an average 
turnover of EUR 3.5 million. Within the group of survey participants, voucher losers have an 
average turnover of EUR 2.6 million, voucher winners EUR 3.1 million. Firms with turnovers 
between EUR 2.5 million and EUR 5 million are more strongly represented among the winners. 
 
 
11 Reasons for an interview not taking place might be that no contact could be made with the firm or that the right person 
within the firm was not available.  
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In terms of the number of employees, another indicator of company size, there is also a small 
difference between voucher winners and losers, comparable to the difference in turnover. 
Winners on average have 19 employees and losers 16, compared to an average of 19.5 
employees for the total group of applicants. The difference between losers and winners is 
largely due to the higher proportion of firms with 0-5 employees among the losers. 
 
The distribution of firms across industries and regions is virtually the same for both groups. 
Most of both the voucher applicants and survey participants are active in “computing services 
and information technology”, “wholesale” or “other business services”. In terms of 
geographical distribution, the Randstad (the conurbation centred on Amsterdam, Rotterdam, 
The Hague and Utrecht) and the Eindhoven and Arnhem regions are strongly represented in 
both groups. A breakdown between voucher winners and losers among the survey participants 
does not yield a significant difference in terms of the industries or regions where these firms are 
active. 
 
It is unlikely that the difference in size between the firms participating in the survey and the 
total population of 1,044 voucher applicants reflects a selection effect that may distort the effect 
estimation. The difference in size is not substantial, and a comparison between survey 
participants and those firms which refused to take part does not reveal a difference in size. 
4.3.2  Contact with research institutions 
In total 270 of the 313 firms indicated during the interview that they had had at least some 
contact with a research institution in the past. “Contact” was defined loosely here, going beyond 
placing assignments with research institutions. A breakdown shows that 80% of the voucher 
winners had had contact with a research institution, and 88% of losers. The high proportion of 
firms which had had contact show an awareness of the existence of research institutions. Even 
so, 171 of the 313 firms had never commissioned an assignment from a research institution, 
even though 140 of these 171 (or 82%) said that they had had contact in the past. Thus the 
problem with knowledge exchange seems to be the step of commercial firms actually placing an 
assignment with a research institution.  
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Table 4.1  Reasons why firms have never commissioned an assignment from a research institution  
  Percentage (%) 
   
No research question  16 
   
A research question, but ...    
   Research institution too expensive  42 
   Research conducted in-house  16 
   Other priorities  14 
   No research institution or contact person known  7 
   Usually commissioned from private organisations (e.g. engineering consultancy)  2 
   Other  1 
   
Unknown  2 
   
Total  100 
 
Firms gave various reasons for never having commissioned an assignment from a research 
institution. The most common reason is that research institutions are considered too expensive 
(42%). Table 4.1 gives an overview of the reasons why firms have not commissioned 
assignments. 
4.3.3  Total number of assignments 
Table 4.2 gives an overview of the number of assignments per firm, with a breakdown between 
voucher winners and losers. Of the 313 survey participants, 142 said during the interview that 
they had commissioned one or more assignments or were planning to do so. Of these 142, 66 
were voucher winners which had commissioned at least one assignment in the past or were 
planning to do so in the future, with or without a voucher. A total of 158 assignments were 
reported during the interviews, with the overwhelming proportion of firms (90%) having 
commissioned only one assignment. 
Table 4.2  Total number of assignments per firm 
  Number 
   
Total number of firms  313 
Firms with assignment (158 assignments in total, incl. voucher assignments)  142 
Firms without assignment   171 
   
Firms with assignment - voucher winners (76 assignments in total)  66 
1 assignment  57 
2 assignments  8 
3 assignments  1 
   
Firms with assignment - voucher losers (82 assignments in total)  76 
1 assignment  71 
2 assignments  4 
3 assignments  1  
  27 
4.3.4  Satisfaction with assignment 
One section of the survey consisted of several questions aimed at gauging the firm’s satisfaction 
with the handling of the research assignment. Respondents answered these questions for 63 of 
the 158 assignments. The results are shown in table 4.3. However, 96% of these answers were 
given by firms with a voucher. Their responses will therefore be interpreted as the perceptions 
of voucher winners. A disadvantage is that this group of firms may give socially desirable 
responses because they have received a credit note. 
 
With regard to the quality of the people conducting the research, the answering of the research 
question and the speed with which the research was carried out, a very large majority of 
voucher winners were satisfied or very satisfied. They were less enamoured of the relationship 
between price and quality; one-third of firms were not satisfied with this. As mentioned, cost is 
the main reason why firms decide not to commission assignments from research institutions 
(see table 4.1). 
 
Apart from the above-mentioned scope for giving socially desirable answers, there are two 
other factors which have a distorting effect on the responses. First, satisfaction with the 
price/quality ratio may have been overestimated, because the voucher gives a discount on the 
cost of an assignment with a research institution. This means that firms do not take account of 
the actual costs of the assignment, but only of the amount they contribute themselves. (If the 
assignment cost is equal to the voucher value, the firm does not have to contribute anything at 
all.) And second, part of the high satisfaction with the speed of the research may be explained 
by the fact that deadlines were set for the execution of the voucher assignments. 
Table 4.3  Satisfaction with assignments (in percent) 
  Very 
dissatisfied 
Dissatisfied  Satisfied  Very satisfied  Total 
           
Quality of researcher  0  5  76  19  100 
Answer to research question  0  3  91  6  100 
Speed of research  0  9  82  10  100 
Price/quality ratio  2  30  63  5  100 
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4.4  Summary 
Information on commercial firms commissioning assignments from research institutions was 
obtained, by means of a telephone survey, from 313 of the 1,044 voucher applicants. These 313 
firms were a good cross-section of the 1,044 voucher applicants. An exception was company 
size, which was slightly smaller for the survey participants compared to the total application 
population. It is quite likely that this difference is coincidental, and not the result of a selective 
decision to take part or refuse to take part in the survey. Hence there is no reason to assume that 
the analysis results based on the 313 surveys do not apply to the population of voucher 
applicants as a whole. 
 
Of the 313 survey participants, 142 had commissioned one or more assignments from research 
institutions, yielding a total of 158 reported assignments. Of the 71 voucher winners which took 
part in the survey, 66 had commissioned a total of 76 assignments (equivalent to 48% of all 
reported assignments). Most of the firms which had not commissioned any research 
assignments said that cost had been a serious obstacle. Among the firms which were allocated a 
voucher, one-third was not satisfied with the relationship between price and quality.  
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5  Analysis 
5.1  Introduction 
The innovation vouchers were distributed completely randomly, by means of a lottery, among 
the 1,044 firms which submitted an application on the first day of the application period. This 
random allocation of the innovation vouchers ensures that the difference in innovation 
behaviour between firms with a voucher (“voucher winners”) and firms without a voucher 
(“voucher losers”) is purely the causal effect of the innovation voucher. We believe that there 
are no factors, observed or otherwise, except the winning of a voucher which can explain the 
difference in innovation behaviour between winners and losers. 
 
The structure of the innovation voucher scheme as a lottery thus constitutes a controlled social 
experiment, with an experimental group (the voucher winners) and a control group (the voucher 
losers), in which the effect of the “treatment” (i.e. the innovation voucher) is estimated as the 
difference between the experimental group and the control group (Cornet and Webbink, 2004). 
This method for investigating the introduction of a policy instrument is comparable to a medical 
experiment in which the patients are also randomly allocated to an experimental group (with 
treatment) or a control group (without treatment, i.e. with placebo). 
 
The survey discussed in the previous chapter offers two types of information about the 
behaviour of firms concerning research assignments. It is possible to distinguish between actual 
assignment commissioning (actual behaviour) and reported opinions (hypothetical behaviour). 
The information on actual assignment commissioning is compiled on the basis of reported 
assignments, and generally offers greater certainty for effect estimation than reported opinions. 
These opinions are responses to statements about a hypothetical situation, which may differ 
from the actual behaviour in that situation. Both information sources are used complementarily 
to provide answers to the three research questions, namely the effect on the number of 
assignments, the effect on the value of assignments, and the effect on the timing of assignments. 
5.2  Analysis on the basis of actual assignment commissioning 
5.2.1  Effect on the number of assignments 
On the basis of the reported assignments it is possible to investigate the effect of the innovation 
voucher on the commissioning of assignments (i.e. the probability of commissioning). The 
innovation voucher is expected to have a positive effect on the number of assignments, since the 
voucher subsidises the costs of the research assignment. The main investment required by the 
firm is to originate and place the assignment. 
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Table 5.1 shows that of the 71 voucher winners, 62 commissioned an assignment during the 
voucher period. This means that in the end nine winners did not use the voucher during the 
designated period. Not using the voucher does not imply any costs for the government, but it 
does mean that another firm might have benefited more if it had been able to use the voucher. 
Table 5.1  Assignment commissioning during voucher period (1 October 2004 - 31 December 2004) 
Group  Number of assignments 
   
Total number of firms (313)  82 
Voucher winners (71)  62 
Voucher losers (242)  20 
 
The calculation of the probability of an assignment can be formalised with the help of an 
econometric model. The application of such a model also offers an opportunity to correct for 
any observed heterogeneity, in so far as this exists. Such a model also gives a good indication of 
the reliability of the estimation of the innovation voucher’s effect by flagging up standard 
errors. 
 
The calculation of the effect of the innovation voucher relies on the linear probability model, 
within which parameter estimates can easily be interpreted as the contribution to the probability 
of commissioning an assignment.
12 Because the vouchers are allocated by means of a lottery, 
there are no theoretical grounds for including control variables. And as section 4.3.1 showed, 
there are no empirical grounds for doing so either, since the characteristics of voucher winners 
and losers do not differ in any significant way. 
 
Table 5.2 shows the estimates for the linear probability model on the basis of the above data. 
The constant indicates that the voucher losers have an 8% probability of commissioning an 
assignment. This probability translates into the general probability of an SME commissioning a 
research assignment. The effect estimation indicates that for voucher winners the probability of 
commissioning an assignment increases by 79 percentage points to 87%. The uncertainty 
surrounding the effect estimation is very small, which yields a confidence interval of 71-87 
percentage points for the effect of the innovation voucher.
13 An extension of the model by 
several control variables results in the same effect estimation. What is more, none of these 
 
12 The use of this type of model to explain a binary decision deserves some clarification. The linear probability model will 
yield a pure estimate of the effect, but not an efficient one, which reduces the reliability of the estimation. If the effect 
estimation is clearly significant, this does not matter greatly. However, an alternative model is a binary reaction model, with 
the logit and probit model the most appropriate. This model offers both a pure and an efficient estimate of the effect of the 
innovation voucher. But a disadvantage of this model is that parameter interpretation is not obvious. 
13 Because of the use of the linear probability model with only one indicator for the voucher winner, these estimates are the 
same as the theoretical deductions of the probability of an assignment.  
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control variables has a significant impact. This supports the earlier conclusion that there are 
neither theoretical nor empirical grounds for including control variables. 
Table 5.2  Effect estimation in the linear probability model 
  Estimate  Standard error  P-value 
       
Constant  0.08  0.02  0.00 
Effect of the innovation voucher  0.79  0.04  0.00 
       
R
2  0.57     
N  313     
 
These findings suggest that during the voucher period there is a 90% chance that a voucher 
winner will commission an assignment. Or to put it another way, nine out of ten vouchers are 
used and one is not. But about one in ten firms would have commissioned an assignment 
anyway even if they had not been allocated a voucher. (This is the probability that voucher 
losers will commission an assignment.) This means that one out of nine vouchers are used for 
assignments that would have been commissioned anyway. Thus the additionality of the 
innovation voucher comes out at eight out of ten. 
 
As mentioned, however, the rules of the voucher scheme were not strictly enforced. For 
instance, some assignment commissions were accepted after the deadline (31 December 2004). 
In fact, three assignments were commissioned after this date. But an extension of the period for 
assignment commissioning (to 29 May 2005) in the analysis yields the same additionality 
estimate of eight out of ten. 
5.2.2  Effect on the value of assignments 
Table 5.3 gives an overview of the value of assignments commissioned from research 
institutions by voucher winners and losers during the “voucher period” (i.e. 1 October 2004 - 31 
December 2004). A striking feature is that the voucher winners in particular mention the value 
of the assignments. Among the winners, the values of 62 of the 64 assignments are known; 
among the losers, this applies to only one of the 20 assignments. It seems that firms have more 
information at hand about the value of voucher assignments than the value of non-voucher 
assignments, or they are more willing to report on this in the interview. 
 
Table 5.3 shows that most of the voucher winners (72%) commissioned an assignment equal to 
the voucher value of EUR 7,500. Hence a large proportion of the voucher winners did not use 
any own funds to have the research question answered. Furthermore, five winners 
commissioned assignments costing EUR 15,000. Three of these five assignments were placed 
with technical universities, which had announced that they would double the voucher amount. 
So in these cases the firms also used only the voucher and did not use any own funds. This  
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means that 76% of the voucher assignments did not involve a direct contribution from the SME 
in question. Research by the Ministry of Economic Affairs based on the voucher claims gives a 
similar result with regard to the SMEs’ contributions to the assignments (see Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, 2005c). 
Table 5.3  Value of assignments during voucher period (1 October 2004 - 31 December 2004) 
  Voucher winner  Voucher loser 
     
Number of assignments  62  20 
Assignments where value is indicated
  61  1 
     
EUR          0  2
   
EUR   7,500  44  1 
EUR   8,500  1   
EUR 10,000  2   
EUR 12,000  1   
EUR 12,500  3   
EUR 15,000  5
a   
EUR 20,000  2   
EUR 40,000  1   
 
a
 2 x TU Eindhoven, 1 x TU Delft, 2 x TNO.
 
 
The effect of the innovation voucher on the value of assignments cannot be demonstrated 
quantitatively, however, because of the paucity of information available on the value of 
assignments commissioned by voucher losers in particular. 
5.2.3  Effect on the timing of assignments 
In response to the introduction of the innovation voucher scheme, firms may have changed the 
timing of their research assignments. Assignments may have been delayed or brought forward 
in order to take advantage of the voucher option. Such shifts may distort the effect estimation. 
 
The commissioning activity during the various periods can be used to determine the effect on 
timing. However, the number of assignments known to have been commissioned during other 
periods is limited. This makes a strong timing effect less plausible, because there were hardly 
any assignments that could be moved over time. Moreover, it became apparent during the 
interviews that interviewees had difficulty remembering when assignments were commissioned 
and executed, especially in the case of assignments executed in the past. 
 
Table 5.4 shows the available information on assignment commissioning outside the voucher 
period. At first glance it is not possible to distill a time effect from this table. Moreover, not 
enough information was obtained to conduct a quantitative analysis of this effect. 
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Table 5.4  Assignment commissioning per period 
  Period         
  1  2  3
a 
4  5 
  Before 1 Jan 
2004 
  1 Jan 2004 -
30 Sep 2004   
1 Oct 2004 - 
31 Dec 2004  
1 Jan 2005 -  
30 Apr 2005 
After 1 May 
2005 
           
Numbers           
Participants commissioning an 











Winners  4  3  62  3  4 
Losers  19  9  20  19  11 
           
Participants commissioning an 











Winners  .  0.3  21  0.8  . 
Losers  .  1  7  5  . 
           
Percentages           














  5  4  87  4  5 
Losers
  8  4  8  8  5 
           
Participants commissioning 













  .  0.5  29  1.1  . 
Losers
  .  0.4  2.8  2.0  . 
            a  Voucher period. 
b Example of percentage calculation for period 2: voucher participants = 23 of 313, winners = 4 of 71, losers = 19 of 242. 
c  This indicator is calculated by dividing the number of participants commissioning assignments per month in a particular period by the 
total number of firms. Example of percentage calculation for period 2: voucher participants = 1/313, winners = 0.3/71, losers 1/242. 
Source : Own calculations based on survey results. 
 
5.3   Analysis with the help of reported opinions 
The second source of information is the firms’ responses to propositions about their behaviour 
if they had or had not received the voucher. Table 5.5 shows the frequencies of responses to 
these propositions for voucher winners and losers. The 19 firms which did not respond to all the 
propositions were not included in the calculation of these frequencies. With regard to the 
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Table 5.5  Frequencies of responses to propositions about behaviour if the firm had or had not received 
the voucher 
                     Winners                     Losers 
Assignment commissioned during voucher period  Yes  No  Yes  Total 
         
Number of firms  62  207  20  227 
         
  in %       
Number of assignments         
Yes, one or more additional assignments  3  87  85  86 
Yes, one or more fewer assignments  76  1  5  2 
No, number of assignments unchanged  21  12  10  12 
         
Value of assignment         
Yes, higher  6  17  40  19 
Yes, smaller  13  0  0  0 
No, value unchanged  81  83  60  81 
         
Timing of assignment         
Yes, sooner  2  11  5  10 
Yes, later  32  1  0  1 
No, timing unchanged  66  88  95  89
 
         
Other effects
a 
       
No  82  97  100  97 
Yes  18  3  0  3 
 
a  The other effects indicated by voucher winners can be divided into two categories: first, time pressure, in that without the voucher the 
firm would have taken more time to find a research institutions by gathering more information and quotes; second, quality, in that without 
the voucher the research would have been less profound.
 
 
5.3.1  Effect on number of assignments 
Some 76% of voucher winners said that they would have commissioned fewer assignments if 
they had not received the voucher, and 86% of voucher losers said that they would have 
commissioned more assignments if they had received the voucher. These estimates of the effect 
of the voucher on the number of assignments correspond well to the estimate of 79% 
determined with the help of the actual assignment commissions from the previous section. 
 
An indication of the probability that a firm will commission an assignment regardless of the 
voucher can be obtained from the number of firms which said that the commissioning of 
assignments had not been affected by the voucher. Table 5.5 shows that 21% of the winners and 
12% of the losers expressed this view. However, in the case of the winners it is important to 
check whether the assignment would indeed have been commissioned in the voucher period. 
The probability of assignment commissioning may be overestimated if assignments are 
included which were planned for another period than the voucher period or which otherwise 
would not have been commissioned at all. 
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Table 5.6 breaks down the 13 winners which said that the number of assignments was not 
affected by the voucher according to their responses to the proposition concerning the timing of 
assignments. It emerges that only five of these 13 winners would have commissioned the 
assignment in the voucher period. This means that, for winners, the probability of assignment 
commissioning regardless of the voucher comes out at 8% (five of the 62 firms with a voucher). 
The figures of 8% of winners and 12% of losers correspond well with the estimate of 8% 
obtained with the help of the actual assignment commissions from the previous section. 
Table 5.6  Breakdown of responses to timing of the 13 voucher winners (21%) which said that the number 
of assignments was not affected by the voucher 
  Number 
Proposition on timing of assignments if the firm had not received the voucher   
Yes, sooner  1 
Yes, later  7 
No, timing unchanged  5 
 
5.3.2  Effect on value of assignments 
Some 81% of firms said that receiving or not receiving the voucher did not affect the value of 
the assignment. This may be because the value of the assignment was geared to the voucher 
value. This explanation is in line with the finding that nearly 78% of the assignments had the 
value of the voucher. Given the large number of firms (both winners and losers) which said that 
the value of the assignment was not affected by the voucher, there are no indications that the 
innovation voucher has an effect on the value of assignments. 
5.3.3  Effect on timing of assignments 
A timing effect may emerge from firms’ responses to the proposition whether the timing of 
assignment commissioning was affected by the voucher. Some 90% of the voucher losers said 
that the timing of the assignment was not affected by the voucher, while 10% said that it was. 
Some 32% of the voucher winners said that they would have commissioned the assignment at a 
later date if they had not received the voucher. It is important to specify this “later” execution of 
assignments by voucher winners in terms of the actual execution, since otherwise the timing 
effect may be overestimated. After all, “later” could mean in the near future (specific plan) or at 
some point in the longer term (general intention). In the latter case it is even possible that the 
assignment will not be commissioned at all. 
 
The “pure timing effect” is now defined as the concrete assignments which were commissioned 
at a different time because of the voucher. The concreteness of the assignment can be deduced 
from the response to the proposition that the number of assignments was not affected by the 
voucher. As indicated in table 5.7, a breakdown of the 32% of voucher winners which said that 
the assignment would be executed “later” on the basis of the reporting of the number of  
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assignments shows that a pure timing effect may be evident for seven firms. This is equivalent 
to 11% of the voucher winners (7 out of 62 firms). This figure also corresponds well with the 
10% of losers, and both percentages thus give an indication of small timing effect. 
Table 5.7  Breakdown of responses on timing of the 20 voucher winners (32%) which said that they would 
have commissioned the assignment later 
  Number 
Proposition on number of assignments if the firm had not received the voucher   
Yes, one or more additional assignments  0 
Yes, one or more fewer assignments  13 
No, number of assignments unchanged  7 
 
5.4  Summary 
The effectiveness of the innovation voucher is based on two sources of information, the actual 
assignment commissioning and the responses to a series of propositions. Both sources yield the 
same results with regard to the additionality of the voucher, which is estimated at eight out of 
ten. One out of ten vouchers are not used, and the remaining one out of ten vouchers are used 
for assignments which would have been commissioned anyway. On the basis of responses to 
propositions, there are no indications that the voucher has an effect on the value of assignments. 
But these responses do give some indication of a small timing effect, in the sense that a limited 
number of assignments were brought forward.  
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6  Conclusions 
Main conclusion of the study 
The innovation voucher stimulates small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to commission 
many additional assignments from research institutions. Out of every ten available vouchers, 
eight are used for assignments which would not have been commissioned without the voucher, 
one is used for an assignment that would have been commissioned anyway, and one is not used. 
There is some evidence that a few of the additional assignments are not actually new, but are 
assignments which would have been commissioned in the future but are brought forward 
because of the voucher. 
 
However, an overall assessment of the voucher instrument requires not only this main 
conclusion about its effectiveness (also called the “output”), but also needs evidence of the 
added value of contacts with research institutions for the SMEs involved and for society as a 
whole (also called the “outcome”). If it emerges that SMEs decide to commission follow-up 
assignments and pay for them out of their own funds, or if it emerges that additional 
assignments enhance firms’ innovation capacities, then it is reasonable to conclude that value 
has been added. However, it is too early to observe these two indicators. Follow-up research 
within a year or two is therefore recommended. A certain added value can also be secured by 
requiring SMEs to match or contribute to the innovation voucher with their own funds. That 
would encourage SMEs to apply for a voucher only when they have a clear interest in the 
knowledge exchange (which would bring an efficiency gain). 
Five conclusions regarding the evaluation process 
The study also offers several conclusions concerning the evaluation element of the policy 
process. 
·  Firstly, a policy design that is well-thought-out – in this case owing to the random allocation of 
innovation vouchers by means of a lottery– offers a good starting point to obtain convincing 
evidence of the causal link between the policy instrument and its output. 
·  Secondly, the study shows the importance of detailed data collection both among the firms 
which benefit from the policy and those which cannot. Without information on the control 
group of non-users it is very difficult to find convincing evidence of effectiveness. And without 
clear and specific questions and concepts, the response rates among the surveyed SMEs will be 
low and the responses will be difficult to interpret. 
·  Thirdly, the study makes clear that effects which come into play over the longer term can only 
be observed over the longer term. Thus the question whether the effect of the innovation 
voucher on SMEs’ commissioning of assignments from research institutions is sustained can  
  38 
only be investigated by surveying firms with a voucher and those without a voucher again some 
time from now. 
·  Fourthly, this study raises the possibility that despite the experimental setting the policy 
instrument may also affect the innovation behaviour of firms without a voucher. Participation in 
the voucher allocation round may in itself induce an SME to seek further contacts with a 
research institution. If this is the case, then the effectiveness of the innovation voucher may be 
underestimated. 
·  And finally, the second and third rounds of the innovation voucher pilot offer an opportunity to 
conduct a similar analysis in order to enhance our knowledge of the effectiveness of this 
instrument. Not only by way of replication of this study, but also because the design of the 
instrument has changed slightly since the first round, and analysis will therefore yield 
information about the effectiveness depending on the precise design.  
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Appendix A: Subsidy document innovation voucher 2004 
·  Page 1 (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2004a) 
 
·  
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  Page 2 (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2004a) 
·  
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Page 3 (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2004a)  
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Appendix B: Guidelines allocation innovation vouchers 
 
·  Page 1 (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2004b)  
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·  Page 2 (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2004b)  
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·  Page 3 (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2004b) 
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·  Page 4 (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2004b)  
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·  Page 5 (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2004b) 
  
  49 
Appendix C: Questionnaire 
Opening question: “Have you commissioned an assignment from a research institution in 
the past?” 
1  No, the firm has never commissioned an assignment from a research institution 
2  Yes, but some time before 2004 
3  Between 1 January 2004 - 30 September 2004 
4  Between 1 October 2004 - 31 December 2005 
5  Between 1 January 2005 - 30 April 2005 
6  Between 1 May 2005 - 31 December 2005 
7  Between 1 May 2005 - 31 December 2006 
If answer is “no” (1), the following response categories: 
1.1 The firm had no research question at the time 
1.2 The firm had a research question, but this is usually placed with a private knowledge provider 
(e.g. engineering consultancy) 
1.3 The firm had a research question, but it was solved in-house 
1.4 The firm had a research question, but the research institution could not come up with an 
acceptable proposal or was too expensive 
1.5 The firm had a research question, but at that time it did not know what a research institution 
could offer, did not believe that a research institution could provide an answer, or did not know 
which research institution to approach 
1.6 The firm had a research question, but it did not have the time to address it or had other priorities 
1.7 Free input field 
If the firm did commission an assignment, response categories with the value per 
assignment 
·  Free input field: project amount (incl. voucher value) 
·  Response categories:  
·  this was an estimate by the firm 
·  the contact person could not remember the precise figure 
·  Was the voucher used with the assignment (tick “yes” or “no”) 
·  Which research institution was commissioned to execute the assignment 
 
Questions about satisfaction with the assignment were answered on a four-point Likert scale 
delimited by “very dissatisfied” and “very satisfied”, supplemented with an elaboration of the 
opinions expressed. 
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Question: “What is your opinion of the execution of the assignment with regard to ...” 
·  The quality of the researcher 
·  The answer to the research question 
·  The speed of the research 
·  The price/quality ratio 
 
This procedure is repeated for all assignments. 
Propositions concerning the voucher: “If the firm had or had not received the voucher, 
would this have had ...” 
1.  ... implications for the number of assignments? 
a.  Yes, one or more additional assignments 
b.  Yes, one or more fewer assignments 
c.  No, number of assignments unchanged 
 
2.  ... implications for the value of assignments? 
a.  Yes, higher 
b.  Yes, smaller 
c.  No, value unchanged 
 
3.  ... implications for the timing of assignments? 
a.  Yes, sooner 
b.  Yes, later 
c.  No, timing unchanged 
 
4.  ... other effects? 
a.   Yes, free input field 
b.   No 
 
 